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This article analyses the role and effectiveness of selected key role-players primarily 
dealing with the investigation, prevention and enforcement of the market abuse 
prohibition in South Africa in order to increase awareness on the part of the general 
public, policy-makers and other relevant stakeholders. To this end, the article 
provides an overview analysis of selected role-players as well as their distinct 
functions in the investigation, prevention and combating of market-abuse practices in 
South Africa. This is done by discussing the roles of the Financial Services Board, 
the Directorate of Market Abuse and the Enforcement Committee. 
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The objective of this article is to analyse the role and effectiveness of 
selected key role-players who primarily deal with the investigation, 
prevention and enforcement of the market-abuse prohibition in South Africa 
in order to increase awareness on the part of the general public, policy-
makers and other relevant stakeholders. Put differently, this article examines 
whether the relevant market-abuse provisions are being effectively 
implemented by the role-players to prevent insider trading and market 
manipulation in the South African financial markets. To this end, the article 
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provides an overview analysis of selected role-players as well as their 
distinct functions in the investigation, prevention and combating of market-
abuse practices in South Africa. This is done by discussing the roles of the 
Financial Services Board, the Directorate of Market Abuse and the 
Enforcement Committee. Consequently, other role-players who primarily 
deal with the detection of market-abuse cases and the enforcement of 
appeals involving such cases in South Africa, namely, the Board of Appeal, 
the Johannesburg Stock Exchange Limited
1
 and the courts will not be 
discussed in this article. 
 
2 THE INVESTIGATION, PREVENTION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE MARKET-ABUSE 
PROHIBITION  IN  SOUTH  AFRICA 
 
2 1 The  role  of  the  Financial  Services  Board 
 
The Financial Services Board is an independent board established
2
 inter alia 
to monitor and enforce the market-abuse prohibition in South Africa. 
Accordingly, the functions of the Financial Services Board under the 
Financial Services Board Act include: 
(a) supervising compliance with laws regulating financial institutions
3
 and 
the provision of financial services;
4
  
(b) advising the Minister on matters concerning financial institutions and 




(c) promoting programmes and initiatives by financial institutions and bodies 
representing the financial services industry to inform and educate users 
and potential users of financial products and services.
6
 
    Moreover, the Financial Services Board was given ostensibly wide powers 
to ensure the proper supervision and enforcement of the South African 
market-abuse prohibition in terms of the Securities Services Act.
7
 For 
instance, the Financial Services Board had powers which include to: 




                                                 
* This article was influenced in part, by Chitimira’s doctoral thesis entitled A Comparative 
Analysis of the Enforcement of Market-Abuse Provisions (2012) LLD Thesis, Nelson 
Mandela Metropolitan University (see Chapter 3). In this regard, he wishes to acknowledge 
the expert help and input of Professor Lawack. 
1
 Hereinafter “the JSE”. 
2
 S 2 of the Financial Services Board Act 97 of 1990 (hereinafter “the Financial Services 
Board Act”). 
3
 See the definition of the term “financial institution” in s 1 of the Financial Services Board Act. 
4
 S 3(a) of the Financial Services Board Act. 
5
 S 3(b) of the Financial Services Board Act. 
6
 S 3(c) of the Financial Services Board Act. 
7
 36 of 2004, hereinafter “the Securities Services Act”; and see s 82 of the Securities Services 
Act. 
8
 S 82(1) of the Securities Services Act. 
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(b) investigate any matter relating to an offence relating to market abuse, 
including insider trading committed before the repeal of the provisions of 
the Insider Trading Act and section 440F of the Companies Act;
9
 








(e) summon any person suspected to be in possession of any information or 
document relevant to an ongoing investigation of the Financial Services 
Board for interrogation or production of such document;
12
 
(f) interrogate any such persons under oath or affirmation and examine or 
retain for further examination any such document unless the copies of 
any such document have been made;
13
 
(g) enter and search, after obtaining a search warrant, any premises or open 
any strongroom for the purpose of obtaining any document which it 
suspects might relate to an ongoing investigation and, if found, to 
examine, make extracts from and copy the document or remove it 
temporarily from those premises for that purpose or retain it for as long 
as it may be required for criminal or other proceedings;
14
 
(h) make market-abuse rules after consultation with the Directorate of 
Market Abuse;
15
 require relevant regulated markets to implement such 
systems as are necessary for the effective monitoring and identification 




(i) delegate, subject to conditions it may determine, the power to 
investigate, interrogate or search premises or persons accused of 
violating the market-abuse provisions to any fit person;
17
 
(j) publish in the Gazette a notice of any proposed market-abuse rule or 
amendment of such rule and to call all interested persons who have 
objections to the proposed rule or amendment to lodge their objections 
with the Financial Services Board within a period of fourteen days from 
the date of publication of the notice;
18
 
(k) ensure, after consultation with the Directorate of Market Abuse, that the 
market-abuse rule or amendment to such rule comes into operation on a 
                                                 
9
 S 82(2)(a) of the Securities Services Act. 
10
 S 82(2)(b) of the Securities Services Act. 
11
 S 82(2)(c) of the Securities Services Act. 
12
 S 82(2)(d) of the Securities Services Act. 
13
 S 82(2)(e) of the Securities Services Act. 
14
 S 82(2)(f) read with sub-section (3) of the Securities Services Act. 
15
 S 82(2)(g) of the Securities Services Act. 
16
 S 82(2)(h) of the Securities Services Act. 
17
 S 82(4) of the Securities Services Act. 
18
 S 82(5) of the Securities Services Act. 
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date determined by the Financial Services Board by notice in the 
Gazette if there were no objections;
19
 
(l) amend the proposed market-abuse rule after consultation with the 
Directorate of Market Abuse and ensure that the amended rule comes 
into operation on a date determined by the Financial Services Board by 
notice in the Gazette and ensure that such rule is binding on regulated 
persons and members of the public;
20
 
(m) prosecute any alleged market-abuse offence in any competent court
21
 if 
the Director of Public Prosecutions declines to do so, in terms of the 
Securities Services Act and the Criminal Procedure Act;
22
 and 
(n) investigate any matter, summon and interrogate any person in respect of 




    As indicated above, these wide powers are relatively similar to the duties 
that were initially conferred upon the Financial Services Board under the 
Insider Trading Act.
24
 Over and above, the same powers were retained with 
a few minor changes in the Financial Markets Bill 2011,
25
 the Financial 
Markets Bill 2012
26
 and the Financial Markets Act.
27
 In relation to this, such 
changes include new powers that are conferred upon the Financial Services 
Board to: 




(b) publish by notice on its official website or by means of other appropriate 
public media, any outcome, status or details of market abuse 




(c) enter upon or search any premises in relation to market-abuse 
investigations during the day and ensure that such investigations could 
be assisted by a police officer, in a orderly justifiable manner with due 
                                                 
19
 S 82(6) of the Securities Services Act. 
20
 S 82(7) and (8) of the Securities Services Act. 
21
 S 79 of the Securities Services Act. 
22
 51 of 1977. See s 82(9) of the Securities Services Act; also see s 8(2) and (3) of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
23
 S 82(10) of the Securities Services Act. 
24
 135 of 1998, hereinafter “the Insider Trading Act”; and see s 11 of the Insider Trading Act. 
25
 Clause 91 of the Financial Markets Bill [B-2011], hereinafter “the Financial Markets Bill”. 
26
 Clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill [B12-2012], hereinafter “the Financial Markets Bill 
2012” (for the purposes of this article, the term “clause” is employed to refer to the 
provisions of both the Financial Markets Bill and the Financial Markets Bill 2012). 
27
 19 of 2012, hereinafter “the Financial Markets Act”; and see s 84 of the Financial Markets 
Act. 
28
 Clause 91(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012; and s 84(2)(b) of the Financial Markets Act. 
29
 Clause 91(2)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(e) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012; and s 84(2)(e) of the Financial Markets Act. 
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    Nonetheless, it remains to be seen whether the Financial Services Board 
will be able to enforce its public censure and other investigation powers 
introduced by the Financial Markets Bill consistently and timeously. The 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Financial Markets Act were to combat 
market-abuse activities in South Africa and elsewhere. 
    The Financial Services Board is staffed with persons who have forensic 
and prosecutorial skills as well as relevant expertise in relation to the 
financial markets. Despite this, the Financial Services Board does not have 
its own sophisticated surveillance equipment in place to detect any 
suspected illegal trading and to provide the details of the beneficial owners 
of securities held in nominee accounts.
31
 In most instances, the Financial 
Services Board relies on the JSE’s Surveillance Division to detect suspicious 
trading volumes and trading patterns. The Financial Services Board further 
relies on the broker-dealer accounts system to extract relevant information 
from other market participants like brokers by investigating their trading 
history for purposes of detecting market-abuse practices.
32
 This enables the 
Financial Services Board to check a broker’s trading history by scrutinizing 
his telephonic conversations, bank records and other relevant trading 
records to detect unusual or abnormal trading patterns which could be a 
signal of market-abuse activity. The Financial Services Board also uses the 
auction-process system to curb market manipulation. The Financial Services 
Board may investigate all the transactions that are carried out at the JSE by 
examining volumes of securities traded, say at the close of the day. Such 
transactions are kept in a database for easy identification and detection of 
illicit trading activities which may give rise to market abuse. This is referred 
to as the transactions-database system, which is reportedly being used by 
the Financial Services Board in some instances.
33
 Additionally, the Financial 
Services Board may publish or issue a press release to disclose the details 
of the proposed market-abuse rules regarding the affected securities and the 
culprits involved.
34
 This name and shaming practice is used by the Financial 
Services Board to deter persons from engaging in market-abuse activities 
because of fear of losing their jobs and damaging their reputation.
35
 
    In order to curb cross-border market-abuse activities, the Financial 
Services Board has forged some multilateral co-operation agreements with 
similar authorities in the developed world, like the Financial Services 
Authority of the United Kingdom and the Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
30
 Clause 91(3)(g), (h) and (i) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(4)(d), (e) and (f) of the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 84(4)(d), (e) and (f) of the Financial Markets Act. 
31
 Barrow “Insider Trading Directorate” 28 July 2004 Business Report. 
32
 This information was obtained from an interview that was conducted at the Financial 
Services Board by Howard Chitimira, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the Executive Director 




 S 82(5) to (8) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91(5) to (8) of the Financial 
Markets Bill; clause 86(6) to (9) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 84(6) to (9) of the 
Financial Markets Act. 
35
 Ibid. 
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Commission of the United States of America.
36
 For example, if a South 
African citizen who is an insider but is domiciled in New York contacted a 
broker in South Africa to purchase any security listed on the JSE in order to 
conceal the illegal nature of such dealing, the Financial Services Board can 
rely on the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to 
investigate, interrogate or prosecute such person for market abuse. Van 
Deventer
37
 submits that these multilateral co-operation agreements have 
been utilized by the Financial Services Board in a number of instances to 
combat cross-border market abuse. 
    The Financial Services Board may itself prosecute matters relating to 
market-abuse practices only when the relevant courts decline to do so
38
 or 
where a matter is settled out of court. The same authority is also retained in 
the Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Financial 
Markets Act.
39
 Moreover, a civil penalty for the actual profit made or loss 
avoided in matters relating to insider trading is determined by competent 
courts.
40
 Under the Financial Markets Bill, a similar civil penalty as 
determined by competent courts
41
 was extended to matters involving both 
insider trading
42
 and market manipulation.
43
 However, there is no provision 
for civil penalties for market manipulation under the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 and the Financial Markets Act.
44
 
    Interrogation of persons or search of premises in matters relating to 
market abuse is only possible when permission or a search warrant is 
granted upon the application by the Financial Services Board, to a judge or 
magistrate who has jurisdiction in the area where the persons or premises 
are located.
45
 This could imply, given the backlog challenges in the South 
African courts, that not all premises and persons will be promptly searched, 
interrogated or prosecuted respectively by the Financial Services Board and 
the competent courts. 
    The Financial Services Board may only consult with, and request the 
regulated markets to have systems that are necessary to monitor and detect 
                                                 
36
 See further Loubser “Insider Trading and other Market Abuses (Including the Effective 
Management of Price-sensitive Information)” 2 October 2006 Insider Trading Booklet final 
draft 2006 26-27 http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf (accessed 2008-10-10). 
37
 This information was obtained from an interview that was conducted at the Financial 
Services Board by Howard Chitimira, with Mr Gerhard van Deventer (the Executive Director 
of the DMA) on 05 May 2009. 
38
 S 82(9) of the Securities Services Act. 
39
 Clause 91(9) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(10) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; 
and s 84(10) of the Financial Markets Act respectively. 
40
 S 77 read with s 79 of the Securities Services Act. 
41
 See the definition of “court of competent jurisdiction” in s 81 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
42
 Clause 86 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
43
 Clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
44
 See clauses 82, 83 and other relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of 
the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 80, s 81 and other relevant provisions under Chapter 
X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets Act respectively. 
45
 S 82(3)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 91(3)(e) of the Financial Markets 
Bill; clause 86(4)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 84(4)(b) of the Financial 
Markets Act. Also see Crotty “First Insider Trading Case Goes to Court” 19 October 2001 
Business Report; Cokayne “Setback for South Africa’s First Insider Trading Case” 28 April 
2004 Business Report. 
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market-abuse practices in such markets.
46
 The same position is also 
retained in the Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the 
Financial Markets Act.
47
 This may suggest that there is some co-operation 
between the Financial Services Board and the regulated markets in South 
Africa. Although more can still be done, one can argue that the Financial 
Services Board has so far played an important role in the detection, 




2 2 The  role  of  the  Directorate  of  Market  Abuse 
 
The Directorate of Market Abuse is established as a committee of the 
Financial Services Board which may perform some of its functions.
49
 Apart 
from the changing of the name from the Insider Trading Directorate to the 
Directorate of Market Abuse,
50
 the functions of the Directorate of Market 
Abuse under the Securities Services Act,
51
 the Financial Markets Bill,
52
 the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012
53
 and the Financial Markets Act
54
 still resemble 
those of the Insider Trading Directorate in many respects.
55
 
    Specifically, the Directorate of Market Abuse is made up of 
representatives of the regulated markets, the Share Holders’ Association of 
South Africa, the fund-management industry, the insurance industry, the 
South African Reserve Bank, the bankers, and the accounting and legal 
professions. These persons are appointed by the Minister of Finance
56
 on 
the basis of their availability, expertise and knowledge of the financial 
markets.
57
 The same position is replicated in the Financial Markets Bill, the 




    The Directorate of Market Abuse is empowered to institute any civil 
proceedings as contemplated in the Securities Services Act and to 
                                                 
46
 S 82(2)(h) of the Securities Services Act. 
47
 Clause 91(2)(g) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 86(2)(g) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012; and s 84(2)(g) of the Financial Markets Act respectively. 
48
 For further comparative discussion on the role of the Financial Services Board see Myburgh 
and Davis “The Impact of South Africa’s Insider Trading Regime: A Report for the Financial 
Services Board” (25-03-2004) 15–30 http://www.genesis-analytics.com/public/FSBReport. 
pdf (accessed 09-02-2009). 
49
 S 83(1)(a) of the Securities Services Act; also see clause 92(1)(a) of the Financial Markets 
Bill; clause 87(1)(a) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 85(1)(a) of the Financial 
Markets Act. 
50
 S 83(1)(b) of the Securities Services Act; clause 92(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill; 
clause 87(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and 85(1)(b) of the Financial Markets Act. 
51
 S 83(1)(c), (d) and (e). 
52
 Clause 92(1)(c), (d) and (e). 
53
 Clause 87(1)(c) and (d). 
54
 S 85(1)(c) and (d). 
55
 S 12 of the Insider Trading Act. 
56
 S 83(3)(a) to (j) of the Securities Services Act. 
57
 S 83(4) of the Securities Services Act. 
58
 Clause 92(3)(a) to (j) read with clause 92(4) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 87(3)(a) to 
(j) read with clause 87(4) of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 85(3)(a) to (j) read with s 
85(4) of the Financial Markets Act respectively. 
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investigate any matter relating to market abuse.
59
 If it obtains an appropriate 
warrant, it has the powers to summon, interrogate, and search and seize any 
documents in possession of suspected persons.
60
 These powers are also 
replicated in the Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and 
the Financial Markets Act.
61
 Moreover, the Directorate of Market Abuse may 
withdraw, abandon or compromise any civil proceedings instituted as 
contemplated in the Securities Services Act.
62
 Notably, in terms of the 
Financial Markets Bill, the Directorate of Market Abuse may withdraw, 
abandon or compromise any civil proceedings in respect of both insider 
trading and market manipulation.
63
 Nevertheless, any such compromise 
should be done in terms of an order of court and any compensatory amount 
recovered in terms of the compromise must be made public under the 
Securities Services Act
64
 as well as the Financial Markets Bill.
65
 No similar 




    Furthermore, the Directorate of Market Abuse may, on behalf of the 
Financial Services Board, decide whether to refer a matter to the 
Enforcement Committee or to institute derivative civil proceedings or to refer 
a matter to the Director of Public Prosecutions.
67
 In addition, the Directorate 
of Market Abuse may only institute civil proceedings in the name of the 
Financial Services Board and may settle any matter only after confirmation 
from the Financial Services Board or a competent court. This may rather 
indicate that the Directorate of Market Abuse exercises only certain specific 
powers in the name of the Financial Services Board.
68
 
    Although the referral of market-abuse cases to the Enforcement 
Committee does not affect the power of the Directorate of Market Abuse to 
take a derivative civil action against a person who contravenes the insider-
trading provisions,
69
 no civil proceedings may be instituted in respect of the 
same set of facts if such person (respondent) has paid the compensatory 
amount as stipulated in the Securities Services Act.
70
 This is probably good 
and justifiable in that it is aimed at reducing the potentially negative affects of 
over-deterrence and the risk of double jeopardy on the part of the defendant 
concerned. Strikingly, no similar provision is contained in the Financial 
                                                 
59
 S 83(1)(c) of the Securities Services Act. 
60
 S 83(1)(c) read with s 82(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
61
 Clause 92(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 87(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Bill 
2012; and s 85(1)(c) of the Financial Markets Act. 
62
 S 78(1) of the Securities Services Act. 
63
 Clause 88(1). 
64
 S 78(1) and (2) of the Securities Services Act. 
65
 Clause 88(1) and (2). 
66
 See the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets 
Bill 2012 and relevant provisions under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial 
Markets Act. 
67
 Loubser 2 October 2006 Insider Trading Booklet final draft 2006 26–27 http://www. 
jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf (accessed 2008-10-10). 
68
 Loubser 2 October 2006 Insider Trading Booklet final draft 2006 26 http://www.jse.co.za/ 
public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf (accessed 2008-10-10). 
69
 S 101(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
70
 S 105(5) of the Securities Services Act. 
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Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Financial Markets Act,
71
 
but nonetheless only the Financial Markets Bill states expressly that a court 
should take into account any award or penalty previously imposed against 
the offenders in respect of the same cause.
72
 
    The Directorate of Market Abuse does not operate in isolation. It may 
further investigate any suspected market-abuse cases forwarded to it by the 
JSE’s Surveillance Division. Put differently, the investigation team of the 
Directorate of Market Abuse undertakes full forensic investigations into alerts 
on the JSE’s radar screen to detect market-abuse activities.
73
 Irrespective of 
this, the Securities Services Act does not clearly provide whether the JSE’s 
Surveillance Division is statutorily obliged to report incidences of market 
abuse to the Directorate of Market Abuse. This flaw was not addressed in 




    Finally, the Directorate of Market Abuse may, on behalf of the Financial 
Services Board, publish a list of market-abuse cases under investigation and 
proposed action, if any, in the press after every one of its meetings.
75
 Thus, 
the scope of the mandate and functions of the Directorate of Market Abuse 
is considerably wider because it deals with all the forms of market abuse as 
proscribed in the Securities Services Act. Importantly, this situation is also 
continued under the Financial Markets Bill; the Financial Markets Bill 2012 




2 3 The  role  of  the  Enforcement  Committee 
 
The Enforcement Committee is established as another committee of the 
Financial Services Board that administrates and adjudicates on all the forms 
of market abuse referred to it by the Directorate of Market Abuse or the 
Registrar of Securities Services.
77
 The Financial Services Board extended 
the jurisdiction of the Enforcement Committee to all the industries it 
regulates under the Securities Services Act
78
 by the insertion of some of its 
                                                 
71
 Clause 92 read with clauses 86 and 87 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 87 read with 
clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 85 read with s 82 of the Financial 
Markets Act. 
72
 Clause 89 of the Financial Markets Bill. 
73
 Loubser 2 October 2006 Insider Trading Booklet final draft 2006 26 http://www. 
jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf (accessed 2008-10-10). 
74
 See the functions of the Directorate of Market Abuse as contained in clause 92 of the 
Financial Markets Bill; clause 87 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 85 of the Financial 
Markets Act. 
75
 Generally see Loubser 2 October 2006 Insider Trading Booklet final draft 2006 26 
http://www.jse.co.za/public/insider/JSEbooklet.pdf (accessed 2008-10-10). Nineteen cases 
of insider trading were investigated by the DMA between November 2004 and April 2007. 
Three of these cases were abandoned (closed) and the remaining sixteen are still pending. 
See the Directorate of Market Abuse Report Media Release http://www.fsb.co.za (accessed 
2008-06-13). 
76
 Clause 92 read with clauses 86; 87 and 88 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 87 read with 
clause 84 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 85 read with s 82 of the Financial 
Markets Act. 
77
 See s 94(e) and s 97 of the Securities Services Act; and see further Luiz “Market Abuse and 
the Enforcement Committee” 2011 SA Merc LJ 151 155–172. 
78
 S 97 to s 105 of the Securities Services Act. 
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relevant provisions in the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 
of 2001 as amended.
79
 In relation to this, the powers of the Registrar of 
Securities Services to refer matters to the Enforcement Committee have 
been reintroduced in the Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 
2012 & the Financial Markets Act.
80
 
    Moreover, the Enforcement Committee is made up of members who are 
appointed by the Financial Services Board.
81
 At least two of the appointed 
members must be legally qualified.
82
 The Enforcement Committee may 
further appoint additional members with appropriate knowledge and 
experience.
83
 Any of the members who has investigated or who has an 
interest in a matter cannot take part in a decision of the Enforcement 
Committee on that matter.
84
 The Financial Services Board may yet again 
appoint, from the members, a chairperson and deputy chairperson of the 
Enforcement Committee.
85
 Conspicuously, the Financial Markets Bill, the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Financial Markets Act do not have a 




    The functions of the Enforcement Committee include powers to deal with 
any matter referred to it in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Securities Services Act.
87
 The Enforcement Committee is also required to 
submit to the Financial Services Board an annual report on the activities of 
the Enforcement Committee during the preceding calendar year within the 
period and containing the information specified by the Financial Services 
Board.
88
 However, the Financial Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 
and the Financial Markets Act do not provide any specific functions of the 
Enforcement Committee in detail.
89
 
    Referral of any matter relating to market abuse to the Enforcement 
Committee may be instituted in terms of the relevant provisions of either the 
Securities Services Act
90
 or the Protection of Funds Act.
91
 The referral of any 
                                                 
79
 Hereinafter “the Protection of Funds Act”; see s 6B to s 6I of the Protection of Funds Act. 
Also see Van Deventer “Harnessing Administrative Law in Encouraging Compliance” 2009 
FSB Bulletin 3 3–4. 
80
 Clause 105 of the Financial Markets Bill; clause 101 of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and 
s 99 of the Financial Markets Act. 
81
 S 98 of the Securities Services Act. 
82
 S 98(1) of the Securities Services Act. 
83
 S 98(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
84
 S 98(3) of the Securities Services Act. 
85
 S 98(4) of the Securities Services Act. 
86
 See clause 105 and the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the 
Financial Markets Bill; clause 101 and the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market 
Abuse” of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 99 and the relevant provisions under 
Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets Act. 
87
 S 99; and s 102 to s 105 of the Securities Services Act. 
88
 S 99(2) of the Securities Services Act. 
89
 See clause 105 and the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” in the 
Financial Markets Bill; clause 101 and the relevant clauses under Chapter X entitled “Market 
Abuse” of the Financial Markets Bill 2012; and s 99 and the relevant provisions under 
Chapter X entitled “Market Abuse” of the Financial Markets Act. 
90
 S 94(e) of the Securities Services Act. 
91
 See further s 6A read with s 6B to s 6I of the Protection of Funds Act. 
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matter to the Enforcement Committee in terms of the Securities Services Act 
is usually done by the Directorate of Market Abuse.
92
 Precisely, the referral 
of any matter in terms of the Securities Services Act must be instituted in the 
manner proscribed in its relevant provisions.
93
 More to the point, the referral 
of a matter to the Enforcement Committee in terms of the Securities Services 
Act may be withdrawn by the Registrar of Securities Services or the 
Directorate of Market Abuse.
94
 Likewise, the referral of any matter to the 
Enforcement Committee in terms of the Protection of Funds Act may be 
done by the Registrar of Securities Services or the Directorate of Market 
Abuse.
95
 Nonetheless, cases in which the Registrar of Securities Services 
has authority to impose penalties cannot be referred to the Enforcement 
Committee.
96
 Moreover, as earlier stated, the Registrar of Securities 
Services also has powers to refer matters to the Enforcement Committee in 




    Each matter referred in terms of the Securities Services Act will be 
assigned to a panel consisting of the chairperson or deputy chairperson and 
at least two other members of the Enforcement Committee.
98
 This panel 
determines its own procedure for the performance of its functions and its 
proceedings are open to the public.
99
 The decision of the panel must be 
given in writing with reasons, and the decision of the majority of the 




    Where any matter relating to market abuse or other related violations is 
referred to the Enforcement Committee as contemplated in the Protection of 
Funds Act, the applicant must give a notice with details of the alleged 
contravention, proposed administrative sanction and an affidavit setting out 
the facts and documents supporting such notice.
101
 The applicant is further 
required to deliver a copy of the notice and affidavit to the respondent’s 
residential address, registered office or principal place of business and to 
give the respondent an opportunity to submit an answering affidavit within 30 
days of delivery of such notice and affidavit to the respondent.
102
 Thereafter, 
the respondent is required in any matter relating to market abuse to file a 
copy of the answering affidavit with the Enforcement Committee and the 
applicant. This affidavit must state which allegations the respondent admits 
or denies, as well as the respondent’s version of facts. The applicant must 
deliver an affidavit in response in the manner stipulated in the Protection of 
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 within 30 days of delivery to the applicant of the respondent’s 
affidavit.
104
 No further affidavits may be filled without permission of the 
Enforcement Committee.
105
 Nevertheless, the applicant may, after prior 
notice to the Enforcement Committee and the respondent, withdraw the 
referral of any matter involving market abuse, or enter into a written 




    The hearing of any matter by the Enforcement Committee gives all the 
parties involved an opportunity to argue their case.
107
 In other words, the 
Enforcement Committee may order the parties involved or any other person 
to be examined and cross-examined so as to determine whether any 
market-abuse offence was committed.
108
 The Enforcement Committee may 
therefore impose administrative sanctions such as a penalty for punitive 
purposes by ordering the respondent (offender) to pay a sum of money to 
the Financial Services Board and a compensatory penalty by ordering the 
respondent (offender) to pay any affected person an amount of money 
determined by the Enforcement Committee for the damage or patrimonial 
loss suffered.
109
 The Enforcement Committee may further impose a 
compensatory penalty by ordering the respondent who engaged in insider-
trading practices to pay the Financial Services Board an amount of money 
calculated in accordance with relevant provisions of the Securities Services 
Act.
110
 This compensatory penalty is usually paid by the insider-trading 
offenders and distributed to the affected persons by the Financial Services 
Board. Additionally, the Enforcement Committee may impose unlimited 
administrative penalties on any respondent who admits that he contravened 




    Furthermore, the Enforcement Committee may impose compensatory 
orders on the market-abuse offenders in cases where there is a link between 
the unlawful conduct and calculable damages suffered by the affected party 
or the applicant.
112
 The Enforcement Committee may also impose cost 
orders on the market-abuse offenders for the investigation and preparation 
costs of the Financial Services Board.
113
 The Enforcement Committee may 
yet again order such offenders to pay the remuneration costs of its panel 
members.
114
 Any order made by the Enforcement Committee has legal force 
as if it were made by the High Court and may be enforced by the Financial 
Services Board in cases of non-payment by lodging a certified copy of the 
                                                 
103
 S 6B(2)(a) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
104
 S 6B(4) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
105
 S 6B(5) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
106
 S 6B(6) and (7) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
107
 S 6C(1) and (2) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
108
 S 6C(3) to (5) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
109
 S 6D(2) of the Protection of Funds Act. 
110
 S 77(1); (2); (3) or (4) of the Securities Services Act. 
111
 S 103 and s 104 of the Securities Services Act; and also see s 6D of the Protection of 
Funds Act. 
112




 S 6D(5) of the Protection of Funds Act; and see further s 105 of the Securities Services Act. 
212 OBITER 2013 
 
 
order with the High Court or any competent court.
115
 Any order or sanction 
imposed on the market-abuse offenders by the Enforcement Committee 
must be made public.
116
 No member or employee of the Enforcement 
Committee and the Financial Services Board is allowed to disclose any 
information acquired in the performance of the functions of the Enforcement 
Committee and which relates to its decision unless such disclosure is done 
in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act.
117
 
Nevertheless, no identical provision is found in the Financial Markets Bill, the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Financial Markets Act.
118
 
    When determining an appropriate administrative sanction, the 
Enforcement Committee may give regard to other factors such as the nature, 
duration, seriousness and extent of the contravention;
119
 any loss or damage 
suffered;
120
 the extent of the profit derived or loss avoided by the 
respondent;
121
 the effect of the unlawful conduct on the relevant sector of the 
financial services industry;
122
 previous penalties or compensation paid on the 
same set of facts;
123
 the degree to which the respondent co-operated with 
the applicant and the Enforcement Committee;
124
 any mitigating factors 
submitted by the respondent that the Enforcement Committee considers 
relevant
125
 and the deterrent effect of the administrative sanction.
126
 
    A respondent or any person not happy with the market-abuse sanctions or 
any order made by the Enforcement Committee may appeal to the High 
Court.
127
 In light of this, the appellant does not need to apply to the 
Enforcement Committee for the leave to appeal.
128
 Moreover, the launching 
of the appeal proceedings does not suspend the operation or execution of a 
decision made by the panel of the Enforcement Committee.
129
 The appellant 




    The Enforcement Committee’s market-abuse proceedings do not affect 
any person’s right to seek a legal redress in other appropriate forums.
131
 It is 
therefore possible for a respondent to be penalized by the Enforcement 
Committee and also to be sued by the affected person in the civil courts. 
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Seemingly, the administrative sanctions imposed by the Enforcement 
Committee against the market-abuse offenders do not limit the possibility of 
further criminal prosecution or other appropriate disciplinary proceedings to 
be effected against such offenders.
132
 This does not amount to double 
jeopardy as the latter court or tribunal is required to take into account any 




    Lastly, the Enforcement Committee may utilize the administrative 
sanctions recovered from the market-abuse offenders for the purposes of 
consumer education and the protection of the public by paying the fine into a 
trust fund as provided in the Securities Services Act.
134
 Regardless of this, 
the authors submit that the mere fact that the Enforcement Committee may 
institute only appropriate proceedings against the market-abuse offenders 
on a referral basis,
135
 and where no compensation was paid by such 
offenders in respect of the same facts,
136
 it could, if not properly managed, 
have the effect of restricting and impeding the execution of its functions.
137
 
Moreover, unlike the position under the Securities Services Act and the 
Protection of Funds Act as indicated above, the Financial Markets Bill, the 
Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Financial Markets Act do not stipulate 
any specific procedure that may be followed in respect of any referral of 




2 4 Analysis  and  recommendations 
 
The success of any piece of legislation in any country is usually determined 
by the implementation of its provisions. It is against this background that a 
close examination of the relevant provisions of the Securities Services Act 
and other related legislation was undertaken to investigate whether they had 
been implemented to curb market-abuse practices in South Africa. 
Consequently, the duties of the enforcement authorities that primarily deal 
with the investigation and prevention of market-abuse activity in South 
Africa, namely, the Financial Services Board, the Directorate of Market 
Abuse and the Enforcement Committee, will be briefly and carefully 
analysed below. 
    As earlier discussed,
139
 the Financial Services Board still has various 
challenges with regard to the monitoring and enforcement of the market 
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abuse provisions in South Africa.
140
 The fact that the Financial Services 
Board has limited prosecutorial powers in that it may prosecute only criminal 
cases of market abuse if the Director of Public Prosecutions or a competent 
court has declined to prosecute them is a case in point.
141
 Given the existing 
courts’ backlog challenges in South Africa, it is submitted that not all 
premises and persons will be promptly searched, interrogated or prosecuted 
by the Financial Services Board and/or the competent courts. Thus, even 
though the availability of adequate resources could be problematic, more 
courts or additional special commercial courts or tribunals should be 
established to adjudicate on market-abuse cases in South Africa. In light of 
this, the Financial Services Board should further consider having more 
offices and other divisions of its departments in different regions of South 
Africa in order to increase awareness
142
 and to enhance the implementation 
of its functions. It is further submitted that, although it might be cheaper for 
the victims of market abuse to claim their damages through the Financial 
Services Board, this might have, on the other hand, also deterred other 
affected persons from claiming their damages through the Financial Services 
Board because of fears that such a strategy would be too bureaucratic.
143
 
Moreover, no cross-border market-abuse cases have so far been timeously 
settled successfully with the Financial Services Board, probably as a result 
of several factors which include, among others, the unavailability of the 
relevant resources.
144
 This could have been further aggravated by the fact 
that the Financial Services Board does not have its own surveillance 
equipment in place to detect any suspected market-abuse practices 
timeously and to provide the details of the beneficial owners of securities 
held in nominee accounts in South Africa or elsewhere. 
    Notwithstanding its commendable efforts to curb market abuse in South 
Africa, the Directorate of Market Abuse is still to achieve more success in 
relation to the execution of its market-abuse duties.
145
 For example, it has 
restricted authority and does not perform any of its duties without 
confirmation from the Financial Services Board and the competent courts.
146
 
This clearly suggests that the Directorate of Market Abuse does not have the 
power of its own to make market-abuse rules and this could be affecting the 
execution of its duties negatively. In relation to this, one could have expected 
that the Directorate of Market Abuse (which is a committee of the Financial 
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Services Board) will be allowed to execute its duties without prior 
confirmation from the Financial Services Board in order to curb potential 
bureaucracy. Moreover, the Directorate of Market Abuse does not have its 
own surveillance systems in place to detect, investigate and prevent the 
occurrence of market-abuse practices in the South African financial markets. 
Specifically, as stated earlier,
147
 the Directorate of Market Abuse depends on 
the JSE’s Surveillance Division for its market-abuse investigations.
148
 
Despite submissions by other commentators like Rob Barrow (the former 
chief executive officer of the Financial Services Board)
149
 that the Directorate 
of Market Abuse now has sufficient measures in place and competent 
personnel to improve the enforcement of the market-abuse provisions in 
South Africa, a few convictions and settlements attained to date may 
suggest otherwise.
150
 In relation to this, it is submitted that the Financial 
Services Board and/or the Directorate of Market Abuse should have its own 
surveillance equipment in place to detect any suspected market-abuse 
practices in South Africa and elsewhere timeously. 
    Although the Enforcement Committee is empowered as a committee of 
the Financial Services Board which administers the administrative sanctions 
for market abuse in South Africa, it may only institute administrative or civil 
proceedings in a court of law against the offenders on a referral basis,
151
 and 
where no compensation was paid by the defendant as provided under the 
Securities Services Act.
152
 This referral procedure might have weakened the 
enforcement functions of the Enforcement Committee and could, if not 
properly managed, continue to have the affect of restricting or impeding the 
implementation of the administrative sanctions for market abuse in South 
Africa.
153
 Besides, in spite of the fact that the Enforcement Committee may 
impose unlimited administrative penalties against the market-abuse 
offenders, not many cases of market abuse have been settled with the 




3 CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
This article has analysed the role and effectiveness of three key role-players 
that primarily deals with the investigation, prevention and enforcement of the 
market-abuse prohibition in South Africa, namely, the Financial Services 
Board, the Directorate of Market Abuse and the Enforcement Committee. 
Additionally, an overview analysis of each of these role-players as well as 
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their distinct functions in the investigation and prevention of market-abuse 
practices in South Africa was done to examine whether they are effectively 
enforcing the market-abuse provisions to combat insider trading and market 
manipulation in the South African financial markets. In relation to this, it was 
noted that significant progress has been made in the enforcement of the 
market-abuse prohibition in this country. For example, in an attempt to 
establish a good enforcement framework, the Directorate of Market Abuse 
was established as an investigatory arm of the Financial Services Board, 
while the Enforcement Committee was empowered to hear cases of market 
abuse and to impose unlimited administrative sanctions against anyone who 
violates the market-abuse provisions in South Africa. With regard to the 
detection of market-abuse activities, the Financial Services Board depends 
mainly on the JSE’s Surveillance Division. 
    Irrespective of this, various shortcomings are still found in the 
enforcement of the market-abuse provisions in South Africa.
155
 Notably, the 
criminal penalties imposed against market-abuse offenders are still very little 
for deterrence purposes.
156
 Furthermore, the establishment of additional 
structures such as the Enforcement Committee to hear market-abuse cases 
on a referral basis, and the introduction of administrative sanctions has not 
been able to encourage all persons to comply with the market-abuse 
prohibition in South Africa.
157
 In relation to this, it was stated that the 
aforesaid referral procedure might have weakened the enforcement 
functions of the Enforcement Committee and could, if not properly managed, 
continue to have the affect of restricting or impeding the implementation of 
the administrative sanctions for market abuse in South Africa.
158
 It was also 
indicated that the Directorate of Market Abuse does not have the power of its 
own to make market-abuse rules and this could be affecting the execution of 
its duties negatively.
159
 In relation to this, it was suggested that the 
Directorate of Market Abuse (which is a committee of the Financial Services 
Board) should be allowed to execute its duties without prior confirmation 
from the Financial Services Board in order to curb potential bureaucracy.
160
 
It was also suggested that the Directorate of Market Abuse should have its 
own surveillance systems in place to detect, investigate and prevent the 




    Moreover, in civil proceedings, the right to claim compensation is given 
exclusively to the Financial Services Board and no provision is made for the 
prejudiced persons to claim such compensation directly (a private right of 
action) from the perpetrators of market abuse.
162
 This could be too rigid and 
bureaucratic and may, if not carefully enforced, lead to the failure, on the 
part of the Financial Services Board, to compensate all the affected persons 
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 Incongruously, the same weakness is replicated in the Financial 
Markets Bill, the Financial Markets Bill 2012 and the Financial Markets 
Act.
164
 Additionally, it was submitted that the failure of the Financial Services 
Board to have its own surveillance equipment that timeously detects any 
suspected market-abuse practices and/or provides the details of the 
beneficial owners of securities held in nominee accounts in South Africa or 
elsewhere could be negatively affecting its combating of cross-border 
market-abuse cases.
165
 It was further suggested that the Financial Services 
Board should consider having more offices and other divisions of its 
departments in different regions of South Africa in order to increase aware-
ness and to enhance the implementation of its functions.
166
 Given this 
background, it is hoped that the academics will conduct more legal research 
on the functions as well as the challenges of the aforesaid role-players in 
order to increase awareness on the part of the general public, policy-makers 
and other relevant stakeholders and to recommend possible solutions that 
could be employed to enhance the enforcement of the market-abuse ban in 
South Africa. 
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